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The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Koste/ec v. 
State, 348 Md. 230, 703 A.2d 
160 (1997), held that Md. Ann. 
Code art. 27, section 551(a) 
(1996 RepL VoL), which 
authorizes search warrants, 
does not permit the issuance of 
anticipatory search warrants. In 
so holding, the court implied 
that it was the duty of the 
legislature to amend the statute 
to validate search warrants 
based upon probable cause 
that sometime in the future 
evidence of a crime would be 
found at a specified location. 
In April of 1995, Howard 
County Police seized a Federal 
Express package containing 
approximately forty ounces of 
liquid phencyclidine (UpCP"). 
Howard County Police made a 
controlled delivery of the 
package to the Baltimore 
address and arrested Randal 
Lucabaugh (ULucabaugh"). 
Lucabaugh was arrested when 
he attempted to leave with the 
package. He stated that part of 
the package belonged to 
Roarke Boulton (UBoulton") who 
lived in Elkridge, Maryland. 
Police later determined that 
Boulton lived with Joseph 
Kostelec (UKostelec"), the 
owner of the residence. 
Lucabaugh cooperated with the 
authorities and telephoned 
Boulton to assure him that a 
friend would deliver the 
package. 
Howard County Police 
obtained an anticipatory search 




STATUTE DOES NOT 
PERMIT ISSUANCE OF 
ANTICIPATORY 
SEARCH WARRANT 
BASED ON FUTURE 
EVIDENCE OF A 
CRIMINAL ACT 
By John Magee 
and seizure warrant based upon 
a supporting affidavit. The 
affidavit stated the police would 
only execute the warrant if: 1) a 
member of the Howard County 
Police Department presented 
the package for delivery; 2) 
someone inside the residence 
accepted the package; 3) the 
police observed the individual 
carry the package into the 
residence; and 4) the police 
conducted constant surveillance 
of the residence. On April 5, 
1995, Kostelec accepted the 
package on behalf of Boulton. 
An electronic device alerted the 
police that the package was 
opened and the police made a 
no-knock entry. Kostelec was 
arrested and charged with 
several drug related offenses. 
Kostelec challenged the 
search warrant, contending that 
the affidavit failed to allege facts 
presently in existence which 
indicated a crime was being 
committed. The Circuit Court 
for Howard County denied 
Kostelec's motion to suppress 
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on the grounds that the 
anticipatory search warrant did 
not violate Kostelec's 
constitutional rights. Kostelec 
was convicted of various 
charges and sentenced to five 
years without parole. The Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed the decision and held 
that the language of section 
551 (a) could be read to allow 
the requisite probable cause 
finding at the time the warrant 
was executed. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to determine: 1 ) 
whether section 551 (a) 
permitted anticipatory search 
warrants; 2) whether 
anticipatory search warrants 
were constitutional; and 3) 
whether suppression of the 
evidence was the appropriate 
remedy. 
The court began its analysis 
by reviewing the I"nguage of 
section 551 (a). Koste/ec at 
236-37, 703 A.2d at 163. To 
issue a search warrant the 
statute requires Uthat there is 
probable cause . . . to believe 
that any misdemeanor or felony 
is being committed . . . or that 
any property subject to seizure 
. . . is situated or located . . . in 
or on any such building .... " 
Id. at 236, 703 A.2d at 163 
(quoting section 551 (a». The 
court disagreed with the 
intermediate court's 
interpretation and emphasized 
that the present tense language 
of the statute referred to the 
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time when the police applied for 
the warrant, not when the 
warrant was executed. Id. 
The court next examined 
prior case law on the subject of 
anticipatory search warrants. 
Id. at 237, 703 A.2d at 163-64. 
In a previous decision, the court 
of special appeals examined 
section 551 (a) and concluded 
that probable cause to support 
a search warrant must be 
based on facts that the 
evidence of the crime is upon 
the person or premises to be 
searched. Id. at 237, 703 A.2d 
at 163 (citing Salmon v. State, 
2 Md. App. 513, 235 A.2d 758 
(1967)). Furthermore, the court 
of appeals earlier held that 
section 551 (a) required 
probable cause that a crime has 
been or "is being committed . . 
. and . . . is located upon" the 
person or premises to be 
searched. Id. at 237,703 A.2d 
at 163-64 (quoting State v. 
Intercontinental, Ltd., 302 Md. 
132, 486 A.2d 174 (1985)). 
The court determined the literal 
meaning of the statute was that 
evidence must be present at 
the time the judge issues the 
warrant. Id. at 236, 703 A.2d at 
163. The court concluded that 
the search warrant was not 
authorized because section 
551 (a) does not permit 
antiCipatory search warrants 
based on future evidence of a 
crime. Id. at 238, 703 A.2d at 
164. 
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Next, the court examined 
the constitutionality of 
antiCipatory search warrants. 
Id. The State argued that the 
majority of states with statutes 
similar to section 551 (a) have 
concluded antiCipatory search 
warrants are constitutional. Id. 
The court, however, avoided 
addressing those states which 
permittedanticipatory search 
warrants, and examined 
Alabama, Colorado and Iowa 
case law which supported the 
proposition that legislative intent 
precluded issuance of 
antiCipatory search warrants. 
Id. at 238-40, 703 A.2d at 164-
65. The court noted that in 
1990, the present tense 
language of Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 41(a)(1), 
which governs federal search 
warrants, was specifically 
omitted to permit antiCipatory 
search warrants. Id. at 239, 
703 A.2d at 164-65. 
Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the search 
warrant issued in the case at 
bar was not authorized by 
section 551 (a) because the 
present tense language was still 
contained in the Maryland 
statute. Id. at 240, 703 A.2d at 
165. 
Having decided upon the 
invalidity of the search warrant, 
the court next addressed the 
issue of whether suppression 
was the appropriate remedy. 
Id. at 240-41, 703 A.2d at 165. 
The court of appeals standard 
of review is limited to only those 
issues raised in the petition for 
certiorari or any cross-petition 
for certiorari. Id. at 242, 703 
A.2d at 166. Kostelec argued 
suppression was the 
appropriate remedy throughout 
the appeals process. Id. at 
241, 703 A.2d at 165. Noting 
that the State failed to address 
the issue of suppression until its 
brief to the court of appeals, the 
court held that because both 
parties assumed suppression 
was the appropriate remedy in 
the event of a section 551 (a) 
violation, Kostelec's motion to 
suppress should be granted. 
Id. at 242-43, 703 A.2d at 166. 
In Kostelec v. State, the 
court held that Maryland law did 
not authorize the issuance of 
antiCipatory search warrants. 
The refusal to recognize 
antiCipatory search warrants 
severely impairs the 
investigatory power of law 
enforcement officials in 
Maryland. In deciding this case 
of statutory construction, the 
court intimated that it was up to 
the legislature to create the 
appropriate language to permit 
antiCipatory search warrants. 
Because a controlled delivery is 
an important law enforcement 
tool, it is imperative that the 
legislature amend the statute to 
allow the issuance of 
antiCipatory search warrants. 
